July 8, 2011

Questioning NBA's financials doesn't solve biggest issue

The NBA owners are making money. No, they're losing money. Wait, they're hiding money. Or are they, maybe, bleeding money?



Now the league is getting defensive about it. The players' union is getting suspicious. Everybody is getting frustrated. Yet no one knows anything different from what they knew seven days ago.
The NBA's labor lockout will mark its one-week anniversary Friday, and coverage of so much recent nothingness already has gotten exhausting. Imagine what it will feel like after one month. Or one lost season.
With no negotiating sessions between the owners and the National Basketball Players Association since June 30 -- and no news generated from either side via bold talk, silly statements or those possible $1 million fines -- the vacuum has been filled by coverage consisting largely of analysis, opinion, spin and most recently, he-said, she-said interpretations of numbers either actual or estimated.
By Wednesday evening, events had come full circle: Forbes.com, the business web site whose magazine was cited as a source of controversial NBA financial "estimates" just one day earlier, carried a blog entry full of new numbers. These "audited figures" contradicted conclusions drawn from the original material and dispensed on The New York Times' web site.
Overnight, a "gotcha" moment -- Ah hah! The NBA really made $183 million in profits in 2009-10 -- turned into something far less sensational, both in headline-grabbing and bottom-line reality. Uh, never mind. The league lost $340 million that season and more than $1.5 billion over five seasons beginning in 2005-06.
And in a situation that would seem ripe for leaks of the complete, actual data, that has not happened. Why? Maybe those in position to leak it would not benefit from the facts being made public.
Confused yet? Here's a recap of the week in sports-biz reporting:
• The provocative sports web site Deadspin.com posted a story on June 30contending that the New Jersey Nets used questionable accounting methods to "make money disappear," its headline says. The story was based on team financial data Deadspin.com obtained from more than five years earlier -- fiscal years June 2003 to June 2006. It alleged that through "roster depreciation allowance" -- a tax method dating back to 1959 -- the Nets were able to make a $6.6 million profit in 2004 look like a $27.6 million loss. The implication was, if the Nets could hide profits then, the NBA as a whole might be doing that now.
Trouble was, Deadspin.com misinterpreted the numbers, attributing as RDA what actually was money used for "player buy-out and a player injury." It posted a correction on its site within a revised version of the story. Also, it included a response from Carol Sawdye, NBA executive vice president and chief financial officer, that noted New Jersey lost a total of $87 million in the three years in question.
• On Tuesday, Nate Silver, founder of the FiveThirtyEight.com blog hosted by the Times, questioned the veracity of the NBA's figures. The blog most often analyzes statistics and data related to politics, but occasionally veers into sports and culture. After crunching numbers -- that is, estimates formulated by Forbes and Financial World magazines from 1989-90 through 2009-10 -- Silver wrote, "The NBA's claims of financial hardship should be viewed more skeptically. ... [It] is fundamentally a healthy and profitable business."
How healthy? Silver, relying on the magazines' estimates, wrote that the NBA made a profit of $183 million in 2009-10 -- the season in which the league, in audited figures shared with the union, cited a $340 million loss. That contention and the blog entry's headline -- "Calling Foul on NBA's Claims of Financial Distress" -- instantly caused a stir.
• Tim Frank, the NBA's senior VP of basketball communications, emailed a statement later on July 5 to Silver, disputing both his use of inaccurate estimates and the conclusions he drew from them. "Precisely to avoid this issue, the NBA and its teams shared their complete league and team audited financials as well as our state and Federal tax returns with the Players Union," Frank wrote.
"They decided they were going to believe Forbes over us," Frank told NBA.com. The estimates produced across 10 years by the magazines never came from access to the league's actual financial data.
Silver posted a fresh entry Tuesday evening that included Frank's objections and clarifications. In it, he cited the league's failure to disclose its financial records to the media and to the public as one reason for the inaccuracies.
"We have one set of numbers from Forbes," Silver told NBA.com Wednesday. "The NBA has a set of numbers people are supposed to take on faith. ... It wouldn't shock me if the league were losing money. It wouldn't shock me if it was making money."
• One encouraging element of the NBA's labor talks this time, right through the owners' decision last week to impose the lockout, was the absence of haggling over the numbers. Traditionally, the union has called for the teams to "open your books," while the owners have stonewalled. But this time the numbers -- audited figures -- have been shared and, with only a few raised eyebrows over certain interpretations, largely accepted by the players.
Until now. In the aftermath of Silver's blog item, Dan Wasserman, union spokesman, said that because the NBA's revenue projections for 2009-10 were more pessimistic than what actually occurred -- the league anticipated a $50.4 million salary cap per team but raised it to $58 million when business picked up -- league data should be viewed skeptically.
"So yes, we feel there is more than adequate basis for questioning their projections and financials,"Wasserman said in a statement.
Countered NBA spokesman Mike Bass: "For Dan Wasserman to suggest that the league's future revenue projection, made before the start of the 2009-10 season during the worst economy in 80 years (which, by the way, turned out to be off by only 3 and a half percent) somehow relates to the veracity of our year-end audited financials is absurd. Mr. Wasserman's questioning of the league's audited financials based on this missed projection is a complete non-sequitur."
• Although Silver posted an update on his blog, only the original version made it into the New York Times' print edition Wednesday morning. That prompted the NBA to release another official statement, reiterating the "point by point rebuttal" Frank directed to Silver.
It read in part: "The New York Times' position is that, unless we are willing to disclose those same confidential financial documents to them [that the union got] it is appropriate for them to publish a story based on uncorroborated and unsubstantiated news reports."
The print vs. online discrepancy may have been due to a deadline issue or editors' failure to update the newspaper version. Asked if the NBA had further comment, Frank said: "The letter said basically what we wanted to say."
• Finally, near the end-of-business Wednesday, Forbes.com contributor Maury Brown posted a piece on the site's SportsMoney blog contradicting Silver's analysis. He wrote of the earlier Forbes estimates, "for those who don't have hard numbers, they are the best journalists can work from." But Brown then opts for Net Income numbers provided to him by "sources close to the NBA labor negotiations."
Those figures from 2005-06 through 2009-10, show that no fewer than 19 teams -- and as many as 24 -- lost money each season. The losses ran $220 million in 2005-06, then $285 million, $330 million, $370 million and $340 million. If the league's projections for this past season prove to be accurate -- 23 clubs losing a total of $300 million -- "the NBA will have lost $1.845 billion over the last six years, not turned a profit, as reported by Silver," Brown wrote.
Whether the media and the fans agree that the NBA operated so deeply in the red over the six-year life of the just-expired collective bargaining agreement ultimately doesn't matter. Whether the players and owners agree on how, precisely, it lost all that money might not matter either.
The players want to see a remedy come more from enhanced revenue-sharing than reduced compensation. The owners maintain that both areas are being addressed as possible fixes. In the meantime, the lockout drags on -- with a negotiating session possibly coming next week, with an uncertain level of urgency until players start missing paychecks and owners start facing cancelled games.

Hornets offer lockout options for ticket holders

NEW ORLEANS (AP) -- The New Orleans Hornets are promising season ticket holders who are concerned about the NBA lockout that they can get their money back - with interest - if the work stoppage wipes out any games next season.
The lockout comes at an inopportune time for the franchise, which currently is owned by the league and is in the midst of a season ticket drive seen as a key step toward attracting new owners who would keep the Hornets in Louisiana.
So team officials hope they can assuage fans' concerns about tying up money this summer in season tickets with no way of knowing when the NBA might start playing games again.
"It is our goal to continue to reward season ticketholders for their dedication and loyalty to the team and our community," Hornets president Hugh Weber said Wednesday.
The NBA's owners began locking out players on July 1, the day after the league's collective bargaining agreement expired.
The new Hornets initiative essentially offers varying rates of interest on top of refunds for cancelled games, with fans who commit to keeping money in their Hornets accounts long-term getting a substantially higher return.
One option is for fans to get cash refunds, plus 1 percent, on tickets for any cancelled games.
However, if fans choose to take refunds in the form of credit toward purchases of tickets for the playoffs or future seasons, they can receive an additional 10 percent, plus another 5 percent toward the purchase of tickets for charities.
Weber stressed that those who choose refunds in the form of credit on their accounts "will also help send thousands of underprivileged children from throughout the region to Hornets games."
On June 8, the Hornets announced a drive to hold 100 social gatherings in 100 days in the homes of New Orleans-area business and community leaders, with the goal of increasing their season ticket base to 10,000 - a figure generally seen by the NBA as an indication of a financially healthy franchise. Jac Sperling, the NBA's appointed governor of the Hornets - and a New Orleans native- has said the hope is to provide confidence to prospective buyers that the NBA franchise can at the very least stay afloat, if not thrive, on the bayou.
As of Wednesday afternoon, the Hornets had sold 8,424 season tickets for 2011-12.
Meanwhile, because team officials are currently unable to have contact with players, they have started organizing a series of community service and charity events that will feature members of the coaching and front office staff.
Between the ticket drive and community relations events, it appeared unlikely the Hornets would consider furloughs or other types of staffing cuts during the early stages of the lockout. Weber said team policy forbids discussing publicly how the lockout would affect the team's operations or roster plans. However, speaking generally, Weber said that the Hornets are not diminishing any resources they've dedicated to meeting previously stated season ticket sales goals.

July 7, 2011

Lockout FAQs: What, how and what's next in labor standoff

Lots of self-help books and personal coaches advise essentially the same thing for those of us trying to get from here to there: Begin with the end in mind. By targeting a future goal, then breaking down the steps necessary to reach it, all the way back to the present moment, one can confidently and effectively move forward.
We'll assume that NBA owners and players went that route in reaching their current end -- the end of pro basketball as we know it. With a big red circle around July 1, 2011, the two sides in the league's labor dispute moved toward their unfavorable "goal" of testing the other guys' limits in collective-bargaining talks.
The mood never turned sour -- grim at times, glum sure, but not ugly -- across more than a dozen sessions dating back 18 months or so. But then, neither side ever budged much, either, off its original vision for what the NBA's financial and economic systems would look like for 2011-12 and beyond.
Soon there might not even be a 2011-12 NBA season. The message -- both sides are strong, both sides are committed, both sides are willing to test the other's resolve in a public staredown costing potentially billions of dollars -- has been delivered, loud and clear.
Now maybe it's time to repeat the process. Begin with a new end in mind: the end of the lockout. Eventually the NBA will operate again, right? Barring a truly apocalyptic outlook, there will be some system, some balancing-act of the warring parties' needs and wants, that will allow players and owners to prosper, while offering fans the entertainment of the world's best basketball played against the context of a more sober U.S. economy.
Start there. Work backwards. Visualize and internalize all the leverage and rancor and heartache that figures to occur over the next two, four, six or 15 months, before actually slogging through it. Skip any further, real strain on the relationship between players and their teams, as well as on the trust between the audience for NBA basketball and the providers of it.
Fast-forward through this lockout to find the end. Then fast-reverse to identify the steps vital to its conclusion. Working backward from something can be more productive than moving forward toward nothing.
In the meantime, uh, we've got questions. Answers, too, but more like explanations rather than the sort of answers that NBA commissioner David Stern, union president Derek Fisher, National Basketball Players Association executive director Billy Hunter, NBA deputy commissioner Adam Silver and the rest of them need to get a deal done.
The Basics
Q: What happens in a lockout?
A: The NBA essentially is not open for business -- not in basketball terms, anyway. Teams still are selling season tickets (or trying to) and hammering out deals with corporate partners (or trying to), but all contact between NBA players and the 30 franchises officially has ceased. Reportedly no communication from team personnel -- owners, coaches, trainers, other employees -- to the players or even "representatives" of those players, either professional or personal. The disincentive? A possible $1 million fine.
This also means no use of team facilities. No contracts signed. No free-agent shopping. No trades consummated. Individuals in the teams' or league's employ are gagged, too, from discussing the lockout publicly, also with the hammer of $1 million fines.
Q: What are the most important issues that have brought on this shutdown?
A: The NBA owners are seeking changes in both the financial split of league revenues dedicated to player compensation and the structure of the system. In the expiring collective bargaining agreement, players received 57 percent of basketball-related income. That produced what the owners cite now as a majority of teams losing money each year -- 22 of 30, they say -- at a collective rate of about $300 million.
The players, bombarded like the fans by news of record-high TV ratings and NBA popularity through the 2010-11 season and postseason, don't see things as nearly so gloomy. They also believe that the owners could improve their own financial pictures through a) more disciplined and efficient management, and b) a more comprehensive revenue-sharing system to reduce some of the advantages big-market teams have over small-market clubs.
Q: How far apart are the two sides?
A: A chasm, with only the slightest movement offered from each side in the latest discussions. In fact, Hunter said the two sides are so far apart in their perspective on dollars, he thought it might make more sense to focus on structural change -- the bigger picture stuff -- when they meet again.
Q: Are things maybe worse than they were before the lockout was imposed?
A: Not necessarily. It is common in such circumstances for both sides to pull back from their most recent offers, forcing negotiations to resume from much closer to scratch. But after the June 30 session in New York, the owners and the players indicated that such a hardening or posturing would not necessarily take place. When they talk next, they probably will be starting from their current positions rather than some year-old hardline spots.
Q: When is the next negotiating session?
A: Possibly the week of July 11-15. When the sides parted on June 30, they both penciled in that week as a possibility for resumed discussions.
The Owners' Side
Q: What are the main talking points of the owners' latest proposal?
A: It's hard to know what actually has been presented in the form of a formal proposal vs. offers brought up more casually, because neither side has released documents to the media. But pieced together from various post-meeting news conferences, as separate elements or in various combinations, the owners have been talking about:
• A "flex" salary cap with a target payroll of $62 million per team, with "bands" below and above that to set an overall minimum and maximum that must be or can be spent on players. The current luxury-tax system, intended to discourage overspending, no longer would be needed.
• A guarantee of $2 billion annually for player compensation over a 10-year deal. This would represent an 8 percent reduction from the current $2.17 billion and achieve the owners' financial goals by limiting the players' participation in the NBA's growth projections, most notably in new broadcast contracts in 2016.
• An eventual 50-50 split of BRI, compared to the current 57-43 split favoring the players. Also, BRI would be defined with more exclusions for owners' costs before the split, moving a little more toward a "net" system than a "gross."
• Shorter contracts of three or four years rather than the five- and six-year deals available in the just-expired CBA.
Q: What about doing away with guaranteed contracts? That was a hot topic for the players.
A: The league backed off that issue last month, accepting the union's view that teams, through individual negotiations, should determine whether or not to guarantee a player's deal. But this is misleading, too, because with any type of hard salary-cap (the "flex" version would qualify, too) a team would quickly paint itself into a corner with too many guaranteed deals. To function, general managers would have to avoid them.
Q: Do the teams "get paid" during a lockout, in terms of broadcast rights, sponsorship deals and season-ticket sales?
A: Teams do continue to get their national TV revenue, with a portion of that to be rebated for any games missed. Sponsorship deals vary from team to team, as does the handling of ticket-holders' payments for games that aren't played or get rescheduled.
Q: Are the owners as united as the players?
A: There had been rumblings of factions within the 30 owners. One obvious split was believed to be between big-market teams and small-market teams -- based on the hunch that franchises in places such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, Dallas and Houston are more OK with the current system than those in Sacramento, Memphis, Milwaukee, Minnesota and Indiana. The biggies make more money, spend more money and aren't eager to have their spending capped or their profits shared.
Another potential rift suspected to exist may be between longtime owners (who bought in at much lower prices and thus have realized more gain in franchise value) vs. newbies who are paying top dollar in interest and debt service. But Stern and Silver stressed after a recent negotiating session that no splits exist and the owners, indeed, are unified.
Q: Would the owners consider replacement players as a lockout alternative?
A: Let's answer that question with a question: How many people would pay to see the next-best 450 basketball players in the world compete? The NBA has invested billions, in salaries and marketing expense, to promote its stars. More than the other major team sports, it is a league built on identifiable faces and marquee names.
This isn't just hype, either; the skills and basketball IQ that scouts rave about and the current players possess are exceedingly rare, and the owners know it. Hiring replacement players for, say, a 2012-13 season if 2011-12 gets wiped out wouldn't fix things. The NBA would find itself mocked or, worse, ignored.
Q: Do the owners have any real-world counterparts?
A: They seem to have things in common with home owners, some of whom bought at long-ago prices and are sitting on impressive gains and some of whom purchased their residences at the height of the housing bubble. We have seen that an NBA franchise, like a four-bedroom, three-bath colonial, does not always increase in value. Michael Jordan, for instance, purchased the Charlotte Bobcats for less than what Bob Johnson when they began as an expansion team. Without exponential equity growth, more owners are seeking profitability from operations.
Q: So the losses they're incurring are real?
A: Let's not pretend that successful businessmen purchase NBA franchises only for the money they can make on a year-to-year basis. Some do it to promote or tie-in with their other enterprises. Some do it because they are marvelous toys. Some do it for ego and a fame not easily achieved even for the most accomplished billionaires. Like buying a sports bar and slapping your name on it, owning a pro sports team probably isn't the safest or most lucrative use of capital.
That said, if the league is running at a $300 million aggregate loss, then yes, the losses are real.
Q: How is this different from most ventures?
A: Good question. While sports is the purest meritocracy and most competitive arena the culture has, a major sports league also is a cooperative venture. In the real world, a behemoth paper company would be happy if it drove a small-timer (Dunder-Mifflin?) out of business completely. It could swoop in and take its customers.
But in a league, the strongest teams still have a vested interested in the weaker ones. They need viable opponents -- the Lakers and the Bulls of the world need the Kings and the Pistons of the world -- if they're going to maintain broad appeal throughout the country. Crushing the competition in the NBA would mean contracting away the struggling teams in smaller markets -- shrinking the league overall and, it should be added, eliminating jobs 15 at a crack.
Would hoops fans really want to see an NBA with just 12 teams, anchored in the nation's biggest markets only? Would the players' union want to see its numbers reduced to 180 from the nearly 450 members it currently has?
In a league where some cities are more appealing than others -- by climate, by lifestyle, by state tax rates -- there has to be some other way to equalize the opportunity to compete for a championship. What the owners claim to be seeking now is a system much like table-stakes poker, where everyone has the same amount to spend. Then the difference between winning and losing truly might come down to basketball skills, basketball smarts and crafty management.
Q: Can't the teams just control and police themselves without requiring the players' financial concessions?
A: One would think so. Except that, if the 30 teams all "got religion" at once regarding fully guaranteed or overly long contracts given not so much to the NBA's stars but to its work-a-day players, the union and player agents might immediately level collusion charges.
The Players' Side
Q: What are the main talking points in the players' latest proposal?
A: Again, only pieces have been made public. But among the things shared by the players:
• A reduction in the split of BRI to 54.3 percent for the players to 45.7 percent for the teams. This would amount to a salary giveback of about $500 million over the term of a five-year CBA, which is the players' preferred length.
• No changes in contract guarantees or lengths.
• The continuation of the NBA's "soft" salary-cap system to allow maximum player movement and choice when negotiating contracts with teams. (One benefit of a hard cap is the difficulty it would impose on teams hoping to emulate the Miami Heat's Big Three approach to team-building; many owners feel the league's competitive balance would be tipped forever with a few copycat franchises, crowding the NBA's best players into only a handful of markets.)
• More active participation in the league's growth than what the owners have proposed. This is the topic that Stern and Silver characterized after the final session on June 30 as boosting the average NBA salary from $5 million to nearly $7 million. (The league has done a consistently better job of framing the discussion on proposal specifics, both through savvier media skills and by frequently talking with reporters after the union reps have departed.)
Q: Do players get paid during a lockout?
A: Players still owed salary for the 2010-11 season will continue to receive payments -- some players have 12-month pay cycles written into their individual deals, a number that has grown over the years. Others begin to get paid in October, while still more start receiving checks -- or missing them, if this thing drags on -- in November.
Q: Do the players still receive benefits, such as health insurance?
A: They do not. Even those getting paid what's owed them for 2010-11 lose their health insurance because it is considered a current benefit. Players are eligible to opt for COBRA health coverage, paying the full premium plus an administrative fee, or to seek private insurance for themselves and their families. This goes for players who want to participate for their national teams in Olympic qualifying this offseason.
Q: Could players collect unemployment?
A: Laws vary from state to state but in most cases, players would not be eligible until they have begun missing pay checks for the 2011-12 season. Even then, the sight of NBA players lining up for government assistance might not be the image the union wants to project.
Q: If there is no 2011-12 season, will players' contracts just have another year tacked onto the end?
A: No, that year would be lost. There would be a flood of new players into free agency next summer, on top of the Class of 2011 currently on hold.
Q: Are the players as united as the owners?
A: There have been splits within the ranks before, typically between the league's superstars and its worker bees or between the veterans and its youngsters. But for the moment, the union is presenting a unified front. When player-representatives of the 30 teams met in New York on June 23, a group of about 40 players stood together in a media session to project solidarity. The next day, many of them attended the negotiating session with the owners wearing matching T-shirts that proclaimed "STAND" to stress the same point. At that meeting, veteran stars Kevin Garnett and Paul Pierce spoke up, supporting the work done by the NBPA's executive committee that is stocked primarily with "middle-class" NBA players such as Keyon Dooling, James Jones, Maurice Evans and Roger Mason Jr. Fisher and New Orleans guard Chris Paul are the biggest names on that board.
A number of NBA players have stressed their togetherness in recent days. For example, L.A. Clippers forward Brian Cook was quoted in the Los Angeles Times as saying: "We as players and as a union will stick together until this thing is resolved."
Q: Is there a chance the players might vote to decertify their union? And why would they?
A: Everyone is waiting for the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to issue its ruling later this month on the NFL's lockout. If that court favors the football players in their decision to decertify, opening the door for them to file antitrust claims, the NBA players could opt to persue the same tactics. However, if the court reaffirms the owners' right to lock out the players, members of the NBPA would be unlikely to invite the legal system into this fight. There also is a chance the NFL could settle its labor dispute before the 8th Circuit rules, making the NBA players' decision less clear. Interestingly, both the football players and the basketball players are being counseled by New York attorney Jeffrey Kessler.
Q: Is playing internationally a viable option?
A: A number of free agents such as Hilton Armstrong, Sonny Weems and Nenad Krstic already have committed to that. Others are free to do so and, if weeks stretch into months, might opt for the certainty of a job over the uncertainty of the lockout. Rookies, unable to build their own lockout war chests, also could feel financial pressure to get to work sooner rather than later. For NBA veterans under contract, however, they would require the cooperation of FIBA and the NBA -- and they could end up jeopardizing the money owed to them on their current deals.
Q: Do the players have any real-world counterparts?
A: Employees everywhere have taken hits in this new stripped-down economy. Few American workplaces have been untouched by some combination of givebacks, layoffs, furloughs, pay cuts, pension freezes or boosted contributions to retirement and insurance plans. The sacrifices that the NBA players have talked of as inevitable, and offered thus far, aren't resonating with too many fans when the average salary of $5 milllion is on folks' tongues.
A pay increase of nearly 40 percent over six years -- as Stern and Silver framed it last week -- in what would be slower-than-historical growth won't win many converts either. Not when a situation is as urgent as the owners have made it via their lockout. Not when most fans, rightly or wrongly, link ever-pricier tickets to attend NBA games to the players' paychecks, either.
Q: How is this different from most professions?
A: The shelf life of a pro basketball player is short. Positions are scarce. Job security is slight, in doubt almost on a daily basis regardless of a contract's protection. While many folks are working their way through the ranks of other careers, players are dedicating their formative years to basketball. Finding the door slammed at 26 or even 36 can make it harder to plunge into some alternative career or experience the same opportunities and advancement afforded to those who started younger.
Then again, most players' second-best career options don't pay dimes on the dollar compared to what their NBA paychecks are. The NBPA members are the highest-paid union workers in the world, as the owners like to remind us. NBA players have the highest average salaries in major team sports, and the stars have more off-court marketing opportunities than most athletes in their sports. For all the wear and tear across multiple 82-game seasons (plus playoffs), most basketball players don't exit having paid a physical toll comparable to what NFL players pay.
Q: Are the players being asked to fix a problem they didn't create or could be fixed in other ways?
A: Yes, to an extent. The NBA owners have not been as aggressive in their revenue-sharing as NFL teams. The have's have shown a greater disregard for the have-not's that allegedly is being addressed this summer as well. But the pressure to spend more, more, more in the top markets -- and the darned-if-they-do, darned-if-they-don't dilemma in the smaller ones -- is inseparable from the growth in player compensation through the years.
The union's position has been that owners should not be guaranteed a profit and that badly run franchises should face the downside of suffering losses. In that sense, the unionized players might be pursuing pure capitalism more than the successful businessmen and entrepreneurs who own their teams.
The Last Lockout: 1998-99 season
Q: What happened the last time the NBA imposed a lockout of its players?
A: The owners broke off negotiations on June 22, 1998, went into a lockout on July 1 and did not reach an agreement with the union until Jan. 6, 1999 -- one day before Stern's drop-dead date for canceling the entire season. They went 45 days in mid-summer without a bargaining session, then watched as a tidal wave of pain swept across the NBA, canceling training camps, preseason games and eventually 464 regular-season games. The lockout lasted 204 days in all and left the owners and players with a 50-game regular season that ran from early February into May.
Q: What does this mean for 2011-12?
A: The summer leagues in Las Vegas and Orlando already have been cancelled. Free agency has been postponed and likely will be hurried up after a settlement is reached. There are no definitive dates by which a deal must be struck for next season to escape unscathed. But if history is a guide, a lockout in 1995 lasted 74 days -- into September -- without changes in preseason or regular season schedules.
In 1998, though, the league kept pushing about a month out, in terms of cancellations. That meant October preseason games were wiped out in September, a New Year's Day game was cancelled on Dec. 1 and Jan. 7 was circled as the last day to salvage a partial season. The 1999 All-Star Game was cancelled due to scheduling demands and the awkwardness of celebrating in the midst of a broken season.
Q: What did the 1998-99 lockout achieve? And at what cost?
A: A number of provisions made it appear that the owners won that standoff. A maximum salary on what NBA superstars could be paid was established -- no more $33 million balloon payments like the one Michael Jordan enjoyed in his final season in Chicago. The rookie pay scale was firmed up, and players had to wait five years before gaining complete access to unrestricted free agency.
Mechanisms to help the league's middle class of players, however, were installed as well. The mid-level and bi-annual exceptions to the salary cap gave non-stars a shot at big pay days. A ramped-up scale of minimum salaries based on years of service was instituted, with 10-year veterans guaranteed salaries of at least $1 million. And then to encourage teams to sign those pricier vets, the league agreed to subsidize the difference in pay over a younger player.
The downside, of course, came in the form of hundreds of millions of dollars in lost paychecks and league revenues to players and teams. There was a tremendous price paid in fan interest, with attendance dropping for three seasons after the lockout and TV ratings suffering as well (in fairness, Jordan's second Bulls retirement might have had a little to do with both).
Teams staged open practices, public scrimmages and autograph sessions, and slashed some ticket prices, to woo fans back. Newer NBA fans might experience the same treatment this time. Older ones might figure, "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice..."
Other Issues
Q: Are teams, or the bosses at league headquarters, likely to reduce staff?
A: That happened in 1998. The Lakers already have reportedly shed a number of front-office employees and other teams are looking hard at day-to-day costs of doing business.
Q: How much might broadcast partners suffer without NBA games to fill their airwaves?
A: According to a story in Adweek recently, ESPN/ABC Sports and TNT stand to lose up to $1.25 billion in ad sales revenue if the entire 2011-12 season is scuttled.
Q: What's up with NBA.com and the team's own Web sites? Current players seem to have been scrubbed off in videos, images and even stories.
A: "We don't think it is appropriate to be using video and photography of our current players at this time," NBA spokesman Mike Bass said.
Q: What happens in the 2012 Draft if no games are played in 2011-12?
A: TBD. Our man David Aldridge dealt with this at length in his Morning Tip this week. A draft order would have to be determined in some way, agreeable to both sides, if team records in a full or shortened season can't be used to decide it.
Q: If the owners were successful in getting a 10-year deal, this likely would be the final CBA negotiations over which Stern would be presiding. Does that help or hinder a deal?
A: Hard to say. While the commissioner surely would not want a lost season or even another ugly shortened schedule as part of his legacy, he also would not want to send the NBA into an uncertain future facing serious financial troubles.
Q: Both sides have remarked about how cordial these negotiations have been. Is that a good sign?
A: It's not a bad sign. Emotions and nasty rhetoric rarely solve anything. They also seldom emerge in full until money -- in the form of pay days foregone -- comes into play.
Q: Why isn't the NFL lockout a good model for the NBA?
A: First, the NFL makes a lot of money. Players and owners have been squabbling over the size of their respective pieces from that fat pie. If they lose games, they all lose money. The NBA, in its current system, actually has some teams that would do better financially if they did not stage games. No players, on the other hand, will be better off in their pockets if they do not play games.
Also, keep in mind that the NFL offseason is much longer than the NBA version. That gave football more time to wrangle, more time to get things out of their system. The NBA faces a quicker turnaround from one season to the next, putting the preparation and preliminary events for next season in jeopardy sooner. That makes Labor Day -- appropriately enough -- something of a deadline for preserving the 2011-12 season, untouched and mostly unaltered.

NBA heads into lockout after sides can't get deal done

NEW YORK -- Parting amicably but most definitely parting, NBA owners and players exited a final three-hour bargaining session Thursday, walked through a hotel lobby and headed directly into the uncertainty of the league's first labor lockout in 13 years.
Do not pass "Go?" Do not collect another $2.17 billion in player compensation and $4.2 billion in total league revenues if the 2011-12 NBA season is jeopardized?
That's the question the two sides ultimately will answer, based on how soon -- or not soon -- they reach an agreement to play basketball and conduct business again once the lockout triggered at 12:01 a.m. ET Friday.
Hammer out a deal in the next two or even three months? Lockout jail might feel like an ankle-bracelet stay at one of those tennis-and-shuffleboard Club Feds. Spend five, six or (uh oh) seven months mostly staring across the great divide in their positions? Everyone involved -- players, owners, folks who make more modest livings from the sport, fans -- could be looking at hard time. For a long time.
After all, this dispute -- the pursuit of a new collective bargaining agreement -- has gone on for 18 months, across nearly a dozen proposal and counter-proposals, with numerous face-to-face meetings in Miami, Dallas and New York accelerating since the start of The Finals May 31.
"It worries me that we're not closer and we spent all this time trying to get closer," a dour NBA commissioner David Stern told a roomful of reporters. "We have a huge philosophical divide."
Billy Hunter, executive director of the National Basketball Players Association, called the difference "mammoth." "The gap is too great," Hunter said. "It's like taking a baby step [instead of] a giant step."
The meeting Thursday was a relatively intimate gathering compared to the session last week attended by more owners and more than 30 rank-and-file players. This time, Stern and deputy commissioner Adam Silver were joined only by San Antonio's Peter Holt and New York's James Dolan of the 11-person labor relations committee. Hunter, union president Derek Fisher and executive committee members Matt Bonner of the Spurs and Maurice Evans of the Wizards represented the players, along with attorneys, economists and staff on both sides.
Given the incremental progress to that point, the prospect of getting a deal Thursday -- or even making sufficient strides to extend the midnight deadline and postpone a lockout -- was slim. But Stern and Silver said even that chance fizzled when the players came in with a tweaked proposal that did nothing to further address the owners' goals of greater competitive balance and profitability. Instead, Stern said, it featured a boost in player compensation from the current average of about $5 million to nearly $7 million in the sixth year of a proposed agreement.
"A lockout has a very large impact on a lot of people, most of whom are not associated with either side," Stern said. "They're the other employees of the teams, they're the people who work at the arenas. They're a whole raft of people who make their living from our industry.
"Given the fact that the teams were basically not to be profitable -- very close to break-even under the players' last proposal -- while the players would increase their compensation from the current range of $5 million to approximately $7 million, we didn't see any other option."
Hunter and Fisher did not share details of the union's latest proposal when they exited. It appeared to focus on the NBA's growth projections, with the players' share rising as overall revenues rise.
In management's last known offer, the players would be guaranteed at least $2 billion annually for 10 years -- compared to their 2010-11 compensation of $2.17 billion -- with increases possible (but at a slower rate than the players suggest).
In the expiring CBA, players received a 57 percent share of "basketball-related revenues" and last week presented an offer to adjust that down to 54.3 percent. They said that would result in $500 million in givebacks across five years. Ownership is seeking a 50-50 split, with more cost exclusions from the calculation of BRI.
Then there is the disagreement over systemic changes, such as the owners' desire for a hard or "flex" salary cap that would prevent some team from spending in excess of $100 million on payroll (and luxury-tax penalities) while others spend less than $50 million.
The players see that as poor team management that they shouldn't be squeezed to fix, suggesting that a better revenue-sharing system among the 30 franchises would solve that. Stern and Silver, citing losses by 22 teams, maintain that the NBA's collective $300 million loss means there aren't enough profits to salve all the shortfalls.
And so it goes.
"I'm not scared," Stern said. "I'm resigned to the potential damage that it can cause to our league. ... As we get deeper into it, these things have the capacity to take on a life of their own. You never can predict what will happen."
Fisher, on his way out of the midtown Manhattan hotel that served as meeting site, said: "I know there are a lot of our fans and people that follow our game that, although we're not going to miss any games at this point, still just don't like the prospect of a lockout. We don't like it either. It's something that our owners feel like is the best way, I guess, to maybe get what they want. We don't agree."
That is, well, something. The two sides did agree to meet in about two weeks for another stab at it. When the NBA plunged into a lockout that shortened the 1998-99 season to just 50 games, there were no talks from June 22 until August 6 -- and that one in August lasted just 90 minutes.
Both sides also indicated that their most recent proposals, disparate as they are, would remain in play. That's a departure from the ominous words leading up to the deadline that offers would get worse once a lockout began.
However, there is a chance the sides will begin with a clean slate sometime in the week of July 11. Fisher and Hunter said the gulch over economics is so large, they all might be better off focusing on the system changes.
Said Stern: "The players on their way out suggested to us that, when we re-convene, maybe we should start from scratch. And if there are things we should think about that we haven't thought about before. So I don't mean to suggest that [the latest owners' proposal is] 'off the table' in any threatening way. It just hasn't done the job. The question is, what does it take on both sides to get the job done?"
That's one question anyway. Another one is, how long can these negotiations drag on without doing serious harm to 2011-12? In terms of financial pain, the players won't start feeling the effect of a lockout until November, when their first paychecks for next season don't arrive. Owners face a more complicated financial picture, given sponsorships, partnerships and advance ticket sales.
But for the teams that have been operating at a loss, not staging games -- while not paying players -- might leave them better off rather than worse.
If the 1995 and 1998 lockouts can serve as primers, a full season could be played if a deal were achieved in September (as in '95). The 50-game version that began in February 1999 after a 204-day lockout had a drop-dead date for settlement of Jan. 7.
Go much beyond that and all of 2011-12 could be scuttled, taking with it the momentum of huge ratings and popularity gains of the recently completed season. That's when a seven-month lockout could become 15, much like the NHL's lost year of 2004-05.
By the way, Stern was asked about the pain associated with slamming the brakes on what was widely considered the highest-profile season for the NBA since Michael Jordan's run in Chicago ended in 1998.
"We had a great year in terms of the appreciation of the fans for our game," he said. "It just wasn't a profitable one for our owners. And it wasn't one that many of the small-market teams particularly enjoyed. Or felt included."
For what it's worth, the rhetoric between the union and the owners hasn't been amped up to 1998 levels yet -- there was more disappointment and resignation than acrimony in everyone's tone Thursday. But it is early.
"Obviously the clock is now running," Hunter said. "I've been anticipating this lockout for the last two to three years, and so it's here. ... I feel, OK, we were waiting for the lockout. Now there's a lockout. Now let's get down to business."
Said Stern: "We understand it's nothing personal. We could swap sides for advocacy. But the lack of animosity doesn't get us any closer with respect to the underlying philosophical divide."
It doesn't get anyone -- players, owners, fans, team and league employees -- any closer to basketball.